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FINES FOR CONTEMPT AS INDEMNITY

FINES FOR CONTEMPT AS INDEMNITY TO A PARTY
TO AN ACTION
By

W

EDMUND

T.

MONTGOMERY *

the petulant Prince Hal invaded the court of King's
Bench, presided over by Chief Justice Gascoigne, furiously
demanding that his favored servant, who was then being arraigned for a felony, be set free, it is reported that when his
demands were refused, he threatened to attack the Court and do
him bodily harm,
"but the Judge sitting still without moving, declaring the
majesty of the King's place of judgment and with an assumed and
bold countenance, said to the Prince these words following: 'Sir,
remember yourself, I keep here the place of the King your
sovereign lord and father, to whom ye owe double obedience:
Wherefore eftsoons, in his name, I charge you desist of your
willfulness and unlawful enterprise and from henceforth give
good example to those which hereafter shall be your subjects.
And now for your contempt and disobedience go you to the prison
of the King's Bench, whereunto I commit you, and remain ye
there prisoner until the pleasure of the King your father be
further known.' With which words being abashed, and also
wondering at the marvelous gravity of that worshipful justice,
the noble Prince, laying his weapon apart, doing reverence, departed and went to the King's Bench as he was commanded."'
In this story we get a glimpse of the respect accorded to the
early day English courts which may well be an inspiration to our
present day judges. There are many who are invading the
majesty of the state's place of judgment in ways less fierce and
bold than undertaken by "the mad cap" Prince Hal, but which
are nevertheless as clearly contemptuous of the purpose and
authority of the court. Actions based on perjured testimony
which are a fraud and deceit on the court are all too frequent,
especially in the personal injury field ;2 orders and injunctions are
HEN

*Of the Minneapolis, Minnesota Bar.
12 Elyot, The Governor, Croft ed., p. 61. See also Shakespeare, King
Henry IV, part II, act V, scene 2, where the Prince admits the justice

of his sentence. 1 Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices 125, 137.
2A typical illustration of many of this variety is Clifford v. Chicago,

M. & S. P. Ry., (D.C. Hennepin County, Minn., 1930) where the evidence
of the plaintiff was to the effect that he had received a serious injury
as a result of which he was incapacitated and had to spend several months
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disregarded freely and too often with impunity. It is disconcerting to the lawyer who has successfully demonstrated to the
court that a witness or a party is guilty of manifest perjury or
has committed acts which clearly constitute contempt to have the
court do-nothing more than allow the action to be dismissed or
merely leave any prosecutions to the criminal court. The hesitancy of the courts of this country to take the initiative in using
their power to punish contempts is perhaps based on a commendably conservative principle, but contempts of the authority of the
courts left unnoticed must inevitably lead to a contemptuous state
of mind toward the majesty of the law, which will result in an
increase of unjustified litigation and a disregard of process, orders,
and decrees of the courts with consequent needless expense to
the state and bona fide litigants.
Where a fraudulent action is brought, or a perjured and
fabricated defense is interposed to a justifiable suit, the opposing
party must in most cases go to great expense to investigate and
expose the deceit in order to win; costs awarded him in no way
compensate him for this outlay, and an action for damages on
account of the fraud means delay and that he must prove again
the facts, which will put him to further expense. Many times
persons who commit these offenses are of the sort whose assets
are difficult to get at, and an execution against their property is
of little value. A criminal -proceeding for perjury or contempt is
of little satisfaction, even if successful, which is rare.
In such cases where there are contempts which result in
damage to a party to an action, it is possible, in some jurisdictions, for the aggrieved party to obtain promptly after the contempt is committed an order to show cause or attachment for
contempt in the main action, requiring the guilty party to show
cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of his contempt and
be fined for the benefit of the aggrieved party to indemnify him for
his damage caused by the contempt. The hesitancy of the judges
to take the initiative where these more subtle and indirect contempts have been committed should not embarrass them in a case
of this kind. It is the purpose of this paper to point out the
usefulness of proceedings of this kind where recognized and to
discuss the rights of a party to obtain such relief.
convalescing and yesting on a farm. The defendant produced moving
pictures in court of the plaintiff doing heavy work on a threshing machine
which the plaintiff's witness admitted were taken during the so-called

period of convalescence.
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Fines by way of indemnity to a party damaged by reason of an
act constituting contempt are imposed under both statutory and
common law power. It is sometimes said that this power rests
entirely on statute, 3 but there are jurisdictions in which a common
law right to impose a fine to indemnify a party injured because
of contempt is clearly recognized independently of statute. 4 The
New Hampshire court has been particularly insistent that such a
right exists,5 and the federal courts have freely exercised this
prerogative in many instances." Some state courts have taken
the position that a statute providing for punishments for contempt
which does not provide for indemnity to the injured party divests
the courts of that state of that power, even if it existed at common law.7 While the power of the federal courts to punish for
contempt is limited by statute,8 the federal statutes specifically
provide for indemnity, and the right to award indemnity has
been unquestioned in many cases.9
An examination of English authorities reveals that the practice of making an order for compensation other than ordinary
taxable costs to the party injured by a contempt prevails at the
present time and has an early origin."' In a case where a solicitor
313 C. J. 89, sec. 136.
4
Stimpson v. Putnam, (1868) 41 Vt. 238.
5
Barber v. Jones Shoe Co., (1923) 80 N. H. 507, 120 Atd. 80.
5Chicago Directory Co. v. U. S. Directory Co., (C.C.N.Y. 1903) 123
Fed. 194 (fabricated documentary evidence); In re North Bloomfield
Gravel Mining Co., (C.C. Cal. 1886) 27 Fed. 795 (injunction violated);
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., (1922) 261 U. S. 399, 43 Sup.
Ct. 458, 67 L. Ed. 719 (patent infringement). While a federal statute
provides for indemnity, these cases do not mention the statute.
7Levan v. Third Dist. Ct., (1896) 4 Idaho 667, 43 Pac. 547. Galland
v. Galland, (1872) 44 Cal- 478.
828 U. S. C. A., sec. 385, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 385. "The
said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths.
and to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court,
contempts of their authority. Such power to punish contempts shall not
be construed to extend to any such cases except the misbehavior of any
person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their
official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer,
or by any party, juror, witness, or other person to any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts."
928 U. S. C. A. sec. 387, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 387. See cases
cited in 6, supra.
10"If the contempt be confessed or proved, it shall be referred to the
master tb tax the costs of the prosecutor; and the party offending shall be
committed until he pays them and give satisfaction to the court for the
misdemeanor." Rules and Orders in the Exchequer, 160 rule 40. 2
Comyn, Digest 221, Title Chancery. Costs in the English chancery
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filed a false and scandalous affidavit in a bankruptcy matter, Lord
Eldon ordered that he "pay the costs of the application and all
costs, out of pocket, to be taxed as between attorney and client."'"
In 1790 proceedings for contempt were instituted in the Common Pleas against a sheriff for making an improper return. The
court "ordered that the sheriff should immediately without further
delay, pay the whole debt and costs due the plaintiff Bond together with the costs of all the applications."
The closing paragraph of the report shows the efficacy of the
procedure:
"Upon hearing this, the sheriff thought proper to comply with
the terms prescribed, and accqrdingly soon after paid the whole
debt and costs, and the costs of all the applications."' 2
In a few states where there is no statute the existence of the
power has been denied.13. Since most states have statutes making
specific provision for punishment for contempts, limitation on the
right to indemnity, where there is no statutory provision for such
indemnity, would most likely result from a restrictive interpretation of these statutes. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
review such statutes as they exist in the various states, but most
of them are for the obvious purpose of limiting punishment for
criminal contempts. As will be hereafter pointed out, a proceeding by a party for indemnity because of a contempt should not be
regarded as a criminal proceeding; the indemnity is limited to
actual damages, and hence no reason is perceived why a statute
limiting the court's power to inflict punishment in a criminal
contempt proceeding should be deemed to abrogate the common
law rule that indemnity may be bad in a civil proceeding. There
might be more difficulty, however, where the statute specifically
attempts to limit the court's power to deal with civil contempts.
In a few jurisdictions there are statutes specifically providing
4
that a party aggrieveq because of a contempt may be indemnified.1
practice mean costs as between attorney and client. Daniell, Ch. Prac.
ch. 27.
"Where a person committed for communicating with a ward was

ordered to be discharged on payment of certain costs, and the costs were
not .paid, the discharge was refused. . . . Solicitor and client costs of a

motion for attachment or committal (for contempt) may be given to the
party moving, by way of indemnity." 7 Halsbury, Laws of England 317.

"Ex Parte Simpson, (1809) 15 Ves. Jr. 476, 478.
12Rex v. Sheriff, (1791)

1 H. B. 543, 546.

"3O'Rourke v. Cleveland, (1892)

49 N. J. Eq. 577, 25 Atl. 367, 31 Am.

St. Rep. 719; Morris v. Whitehead, (1871)

65 N. C. 637.

1428 U. S. C. A.; sec. 387, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 387. "If

the accused be found guilty, judgment shall be entered accordingly, pre-
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Except in New York the decisions do not indicate that the usefulness of such statutes is fully realized.
The versatility of these statutes and the common law principle of indemnity may be appreciated by reviewing a few of the
cases where indemnity has been awarded. For fabricating a
printed exhibit in an infringement case a federal court fined two
parties, found guilty of the contempt, each $1000.00, half of
which was to go to the complainant in the contempt proceeding. 15
scribing the punishment, either by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the
discretion of the court. Such fine shall be paid to the United States or to

the complainant or other party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may, where more than one is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the court may direct, but in no case shall the
fine to be paid to the United States exceed, in case the accused is a natural
person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment exceed the term
of six months."
McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y. Bk. 29, sec. 773. "If an actual loss or
injury has been produced to a party to an action or special proceeding, by
reason of the misconduct proved against the offender, and the case is not
one where it is specially prescribed by law, that an action may be maintained to recover damages for the loss or injury, a fine, sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party, must be imposed upon the offender, and
collected, and paid over to the aggrieved party, under the direction of
the court. The payment and acceptance of such a fine constitute a bar
to an action by the aggrieved party, to recover damages for the loss
or injury. Where it is not shown that such an actual loss or injury
has been produced, a fine must be imposed, not exceeding the amount of
the complainant's costs and expenses, and two hundred and fifty dollars in
addition thereto, and 'must be collected and paid, in like manner. A corporation may be fined as prescribed in this section."
Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, sec. 9803. "If any actual loss or injury
to a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to his right
therein, is caused by such contempt, the court or officer, in addition to
the fine or imprisonment imposed therefor, may order thd person guilty
of the contempt to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient
to indemnify him and satisfy his costs and expenses, which order, and the
acceptance of money thereunder, shall be a bar to an action for such
loss and injury."
Utah Comp. L. 1917, sec. 7068. "If an actual loss or injury to a
party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to his right therein, is
caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to the fine or imprisonment
imposed for the contempt, or in place thereof, may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient
to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and
the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved
party for such loss or injury."
Wisconsin, Statutes 1929, sec. 295.14. "If an actual loss or injury
has been produced to any party by the misconduct alleged the court shall
order a sufficient sum to be paid by the defendant to such party to indemnify
him and to satisfy his costs and expenses, instead of imposing a fine on
such defendant; and in such case the payment and acceptance of such
sum shall be an absolute bar to any action to recover damages for such
injury or loss. Where no actual loss or injury has been produced the fine
shall not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars over and above costs and
expenses
of the.proceedings."
15 Chicago Directory Co. v. U. S. Directory Co., (CC.N.Y. 1903)
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In Minnesota, attorney's fees and other expenses have been
awarded to the complaining party, where the violation of an injunction was a contempt.16 Where a party violated an order of
the United States circuit court of appeals and was held in contempt of its authority, its order, granting indemnity to the aggrieved party, was upheld."' In New York there are many cases
where parties have been fined for the benefit of a party whose
remedies have been impaired because of a contempt arising out of
a failure to obey orders in supplementary proceedings."5
It will be observed that the contempts cited were of the class
commonly classified as civil, as well as criminal contempts. There
is nothing in the common law statement of this rule of indemnity,
or its statement in the majority of state statutes, which restricts
its application to any particular type of contempts. There is a
great variety of contempts which often result in injury or damage
to a party to an action. Willful and persistent perjury, subornation of perjury, interference with jurors and witnesses, disobedience of a court order, failure to heed a subpoena, and the bringing of false and fraudulent actions have all been held under certain circumstances to be contempts, and the rule that a party
whose rights have been impaired or prejudiced by the contempt
may recover his damages "out of pocket" in a summary proceeding supplementary to the main action is of wholesome practical
value. A more widespread use of this power might have a salutary effect on many who these days look upon an action in court
as merely a business or gambling transaction attended by the
morals and ethics of the market place, rather than as a function
of government whose purpose is the preservation and maintenance
of justice.
This paper is a suggestion of the uses of this seldom used
legal remedy, rather than an encyclopedic review of authorities,
and no attempt will be made to detail the decisions defining contempts, but citation of a few cases will show what possibilities
there are for indemnity through proceedings of this kind.
Where an action or other proceeding is instituted which is
based on false affidavits or perjured testimony, the other party is
123 Fed.
194.
16 State v. District Court, (1911) 113 Minn. 304, 129 N. W. 583; Campbell v.7 Motion Picture Mach. Op., (1922) 151 Minn. 238, 188 N. W. 787.
1 Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., (1923) 261 U. S. 399,
435 Sup.
Ct. 458, 67 L. Ed. 719.
18 Matter of Hatfield, (1897) 17 App. Div. 430, 45 N. Y. S. 270,
affirmed 155 N. Y. 628, 49 N. E. 1097.
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often unjustly called upon to make large expenditures to investigate the case and defend himself. A contempt proceeding may
provide a speedy remedy, not only against the parties who instituted the proceedings, but against their attorneys and others who
conspired with them. And the decisions show that the court may
enforce payment of the indemnity by imprisonment.10 Misconduct
in office by any officers of the court, whereby the administration of
justice is brought into disrepute, and deceit or abuse of process
or proceedings of a court by a party to an action or special proceeding all constitute contempt.20 Upon this general principle
parties have been held guilty of contempt for presenting false affidavits upon which an order of reference was obtained,21 for bringing an action to dispossess a tenant based on untrue facts,"2 for
obtaining possession of the books of a registry office by representing that a mandamus nisi was a mandamus absolute,21 and
for falsely claiming to be an heir in a probate proceeding.2' Also
under this principle attorneys and other court officers have been
guilty of contempt for their part in false or fraudulent proceedings. 25 A physician and an attorney may be guilty of a conspiracy
19
Chicago Directory Co. v. U. S. Directory Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1903)
123 Fed. 194. Dollard v. Koronsky, (1908) 113 N. Y. S. 792. Campbell
v. Motion
Picture Mach. Op., (1922) 151 Minn. 238, 186 N. W. 787.
20

Rapalje, Contempt, sec. 15; Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, sec. 9793; 28
U. S. C. A. sec. 385, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 385; McKinney's
Consol.
21 Laws of N. Y., Bk. 29, Sec. 753.
Dollard v.Koronsky, (1908) 61 Misc. Rep. 392, 113 N. Y. S. 793.
"It is high time for the court in unmistakable language to denounce conduct such as that of which the defendant stands proven guilty. It is not
enough to say that one guilty of such conduct may be punished by prosecution at the hands of the criminal authorities. There are penalties more
severe to a man of the character of the defendant than a prosecution
for perjury. To such a man the deprivation of liberty means nothing as

compared with deprivation of property. The former may annoy or dis-

grace, but the latter affects him most. The court has carefully examined
all the facts and circumstances in this case and it has no compunction in
performing the duty which now devolves upon it. Affidavits of the
character made by the defendant are offered daily in the courts with
almost as much ease as the presentation of visiting cards, and the court
has heretofore expressed its determination of rendering all its aid in
stamping out an evil which is fast stifling justice in our courts.
"The motion to punish for contempt is granted. The defendant is

fined the sum of $1,759.46, to be paid within 10 days after the entry of
an order hereon and service of a copy of the order hereon upon him.
In default
of such payment, let a commitment to the county jail be issued."
22
Agatowski v. Novinsky, (1925) 124 Misc. Rep. 305, 208 N. Y. S.
514. Case disapproved in Gernhardt v. Boland, (1925) 125 Misc. Rep.
783, 23
211 N. Y. S. 877.
1n re McLay, (1864) 24 U. C. Q. B. 54.
24
Blankenburg
v. Commonwealth, (1930) 272 Mass. 25, 172 N. E. 209.
25
In Barber v. Jones Shoe Co., (1923) 80 N. H. 507, 120 At. 80,
attorneys were fined for the benefit of a party because they violated a
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to commit a contempt where they conspire with the plaintiff in a
personal injury action to bring a suit upon a false claim of injury.20
The theory of conspiracy is particularly useful in a fraudulent
personal injury suit, as the plaintiff is often financially irresponsible and the attorney and physician are the only ones from
whom indemnity can be collected. Difficulty of proof will always
be encountered, but where investigation clearly shows the persistent perjury of the plaintiff, sufficient proof to involve the
physicians and attorneys if they be in conspiracy is often uncovered and is ample for a conviction. 27 If this remedy were
stipulation entered iito in open court. United States v. Ford, (D.C.
Mont. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 990 (atty. filing a false bill of exceptions). In re
Toepel, (1905) 139 Mich. 85, 102 N. W. 369, (coroner presenting false
certificate that he had held inquest.)
It is contempt for an attorney to counsel disobedience to a court order
which the court had power to make, even though erroneous. Anderson v.
Comptois, (C.C.A. 1901) 109 Fed. 971; People v. Seymour, (1916)
272 Ill. 295, 111 N. E. 1008; (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 97.
26In Melton v. Commonwealth, (1914) 160 Ky. 642," 170 S. W. 37,
L. R. A. 1915B 689, two attorneys and a doctor had induced the plaintiff,
who had been in an accident in which he received no injuries, to bring a
suit claiming that a former injury was received in the accident. The
attorneys brought the suit, and the physician testified in plaintiff's behalf.
The trial judge filed informations charging the attorneys and the physicians
with contempt on which they were convicted. The physician appealed, and
his conviction was reversed. The court, however, was divided. The following quotation from the dissenting opinion is persuasive: "It is well
settled that courts have an inherent power at common law to puniih any
act, whether committed in or out of their presence, which tends to impede,
embarrass or obstruct them in the discharge of their duties; and the
legislature, while it may regulate the procedure, cannot fetter the power."
"That the conspiracy of the defendants to have an action instituted
upon grounds which were false, and which they knew to be false, carried
out by the actual bringing of the suit, was the doing of that which 'tends
directly to impede the course of justice and to corrupt justice itself' there
can be no question. That the courts at common law had the power to
protect themselves from false and fraudulent suits must also be admitted.
In Coxe v. Phillips, Hardw. 237, Lord Hardwicke held a fictitious action
to be a contempt of court and committed the parties and their common law
attorney. See, also, R. J. Elsaw, 10 Eng. Com. Law 272; Henkins v.
Guerss, 12 East. 247; Gibson v. Tilton, 17 Am. Dec. 306. These were
cases of feigned causes of action, and if the bringing of such an action
is a contempt, how much more a contempt is it to bring a fraudulent action
for the express purpose of corrupting justice?"
"The authorities cited by the court do not conflict with those above
cited. A long quotation is made from Blackstone's Commentaries, but
it will be observed that Blackstone, amcng other things says: 'Some of
these contempts may arise , . . by anything, in short, that demonstrates a
gross want of that regard and respect which, when once courts of justice
are deprived of, their authority (so necessary for the good order of the
kingdom)
is entirely lost among the people.'"
27
The physician's own records, statements of the plaintiff or his family
to investigators, coupled with moving pictures or photographs are often
more than persuasive that the physician and the attorney had knowledge
of the falsity of the claim. In this connection the argument of the dis-
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made use of in all clear cases, the example should act as a deterrent
to many frauds and contempts.
The bringing of fictitious 2 8 and unauthorized"0 actions has
also been held to be contempt from early times.
Closely allied to these cases are the decisions which hold that
perjury is a contempt, although the cases are not in entire accord
as to when perjury is a contempt.3 0 It is well established that the
court should not take the position that the witness is perjuring
himself unless the court has judicial knowledge that the testisenting opinion in Melton v. Commonwealth, (1914) 160 Ky. 642, 170
S. W. 37, L. R. A. 1915B 689, is instructive.
"A conspiracy is usually carried out by a succession of acts, and the
nature of the conspiracy is to be determined by all that was done, and
not by what took place on one occasion alone. The plastering up of
Collins at the drug store, the drawing of the contract by which the attorney
was to receive a sum equal to one-half of the amount recovered, and the
persuasion of Collins that he was injured and should bring a suit wvas the
first step. This was followed by the actual bringing of the suit pursuant
to the purpose of the conspiracy. Under a regulation in force in the
Jefferson circuit court, suits are assigned to the different divisions in
rotation, and, this suit having fallen into the division presided over by
Judge Fields, the conspiracy culminated in the bringing of a false suit in
his court. It is true that Dr. Melton did not write the petition, and did
not file it in the clerk's office with his own hands. This was done by his
ally and fellow worker, the attorney, but Dr. Melton is as much responsible
for the contempt as if he had filed the petition with his own hands, because it was all done by his associates pursuant to the plan mapped out
between them and for the purpose of carrying out that plan. . . . Dr.
Melton is equally responsible with the attorneys who were simply acting
for him as well as themselves in what they did. After the suit was
brought, Dr. Melton, though he did not treat him professionally, directly
and indirectly made efforts to get Collins to stand up to the action which
had been brought and the attempt to foist the fraud upon the court. What
he did at the drug store before the action was brought, and what he did
by himself and others after the action was brought, is all to be considered
together, for it was part of one purpose.
"This is a very serious case, and not without importance in the administration of justice. Hairsplitting distinctions should not be indulged
to protect from punishment a man who is clearly guilty of an effort to corrupt public justice. Dr. Melton is a member of a learned profession.
He did not act ignorantly, and it is especially important that the administration of justice should be protected against frauds devised by people of
learning and position in the community. It is peculiarly important that the
big fish should not escape the net of the law in which the little fish nearly
always find themselves entangled."
28
Smith v. Brown, (1848) 3 Tex. 360.
29
Howard v. Rooson, (1930) 2 Leigh (29 Va.). 733. "Suing in
feigned names, or in the names of others without their privity and consent
is an abuse of process and contempt."
3
9See (1926) 10 MINNEsOTA LAw REVIEv 252; 11 A. L, R. 342; (1930)
64 U. S. L Rev. 661; (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAw Rnvmw 441; Matter of
Silberman Dairy Co. v. Econopouly, (1917) 177 App. Div. 97, 163 N. Y. S.
824; Matter of Ferguson, (1930) 138 Misc. Rep. 326, 224 N. Y. S. 667
(holding deliberate admitted perjury contempt and disagreeing with the
previous case.)
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mony is false, or unless the perjury is admitted, or manifest from
other testimony of the witness.31 Some opinions state that perjury is contempt only when it "operates as an obstruction to the
administration of justice, '3 2 and some decisions hold that the
perjury must be "willful and persistent" in order to constitute
contempt, and must relate to material issues in the case. But
there are many cases holding perjury to be contempt where such
3
elements are attendant.
Building up a line of false testimony in regard to a nonexistent injury or accident ought clearly to be "wilful and persistent" perjury and punishable as contempt where on cross examination the witness or party is forced to admit its falsity in material
particulars.34 Subornation of perjury may also be a contempt
and involve responsible persons behind the scenes.35 Fabrication
of printed exhibits has been held contempt warranting the granting of indemnity, 36 and the filing of contradictory affidavits has
31Ex parte Hudgings, (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L.
Ed. 656, 11 A. L. R. 333; Hegelaw v. State, (1927) 24 Ohio App. 103,
155 32
N. E. 620.
State v. Meese. (1930) 200 Wis. 454, 229 N. W. 31.
3
United States v. Karnes, (N.D. Okla. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 453;
Edwards v. Edwards, (1917) 87 N. J. Eq. 546, 548, 100 Atl. 608, "Where the
facts are admitted or demonstrated the court would be shirking a clear
duty if it failed to punish perjury as a contempt" (Divorce secured on
perjured testimony); Young v. State, (1926) 198 Ind. 629, 154 N. E.
478, (where defendant admitted falsity of testimony); In re Rosenberg,
(1895) 90 Wis. 581, 63 N. W. 1065 (refusal to answer questions) ; Gordon
v. Commonwealth, (1911) 141 Ky. 461, 133 S. W. 206 (where defendant
admitted testifying to an accident he had in fact never seen) ; Eykelboom
v. People, (1922) 71 Colo. 318, 206 Pac. 388 (refusal to produce documents subpoenaed; the falsity of the witness's justification was manifest
from his own testimony).
For reviews of cases where perjury is or is not contempt see notes
(1924)

8 MNNESOTA LAw REviEmw 441, (1926)

10 MiNNESOTA LAW RE-

viw 252. See also note in (1929) 38 Yale Law J. 543, where after reviewing authorities allowing and limiting perjury as contempt, it is said,
"It is submitted that the social necessity of a deterrent decidedly overbalances
these objections to the punishment of perjury as contempt."
34
"Of possible acts, few are so antagonistic to the objects of judicial
administration as the intentional false swearing which seeks to baffle the
search of truth, without which justice is impossible. Such swearing is a
flagrant insult to the dignity of the court." 1 Chamberlayne, Modern Law
of Evidence,
sec. 249.
35
Taylor v. State, (1924) 112 Neb. 259, 199 N. W. 509 (inducing
child witness to change testimony by offer of new dress) ; State v. Kayscr,
(1919)6 25 N. M. 245, 181 Pac. 278.
" Chicago Directory Co. v. U. S. Directory Co., (-C.C. N.Y. 1903)
123 Fed. 194. Following is the opinion in full:
"There are many contradictions in the affidavits presented by the
respective parties; but a careful review of the whole case, and an analysis
of the evidence afforded by the documents on file, has clearly convinced
the court that, subsequent to the order to show cause why injunction should
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been construed 3 as
contempt where material matters were deliber7
ately misstated.

Since interference with witnesses or jurors is a contempt, indemnity might be obtained because of loss occasioned by such
contempt, 35 Such interferences with the proceedings of the court
are often indulged in by intermeddlers without the consent of
either party; where such interference makes a new trial necessary
and is also a contempt, ought there not to be ground for indemnity?
Violations of orders, decrees, or injunctions of a court are
among the most common forms of contempt. On proof of damages by the party for whom the order was made, the person in
contempt has been in many cases fined for the benefit of the injured party in an amount equal to his loss plus costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the contempt proceeding. 9 And fines have
been'imposed as indemnity in cases where orders in proceedings
supplementary to execution have been ignored.'
not be issued the defendants fabricated or caused to be fabricated, 16
pages which were represented on their behalf to the court as being the first
16 pages of their Chicago section of Directory as the same existed before
the motion was made, when in truth and in fact the genuine pages were
markedly different therefrom. This is a very gross piece of contempt, and
the only reason the imprisonment is made so brief is because the same
acts constitute a criminal offense, for which, despite the infliction of penalty
for contempt, the guilty parties may be imprisoned. Each of the defendants, Fallon and Dwyer, is fined $1,000, one-half to the United States,
one-half to the complainant, and is committed to jail for ten days, and
until the fine is paid."
37
Sachs v. High Clothing Company, (1919) 90 N. J. Eq. 545, 108 At!.
58; Backer v. A. B. & B. Realty Co., (1930) 107 N. J. Eq. 246, 152 AUt.
241. But the filing of a false petition or pleading unverified is not a contempt. Gernhardt v. Boland, (1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 783, 211 N. Y. S. 877.
38
State v. Havel, (1931) 120 Neb. 832, 235 N. W. 584. Inducing a
witness to testify falsely interferes with the administration of justice,
and the parties stand out against the authority of the court and are guilty
of contempt even though no action is pending at the time the inducement is
made. In re Brule, (D.C. Nev. 1895) 71 Fed. 943; Hale v. State, (1896)
55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199 (attempts to induce witnesses to leave state) ;
Sinclair v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct 471, 73 L. Ed.
938, 63 A. L R. 1258 (jury shadowing); Matter of Werra, (1924) 123
Misc. Rep. 788, 206 N. Y. S. 455, affirmed (1924) 208 App. Div. 856,
204 N. Y. S.957 (juror guilty of contempt for soliciting bribe.)
39
Campbell v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, (1922) 151 Minn.
238, 186 N. W. 787; Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., (1910) 221
U. S.40 418, 31 Sup. Ct 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L R. A. (N.S.) 874.
Matter of Hatfield, (1897) 17 App. Div. 430, 45 N. Y. 5. 270
affirmed 155 N. Y. 628, 49 N. E. 1097; Hanson v. Heckheimer, (1925)
124 Misc. Rep. 509, 208 N. Y. S. 451 (where judgment debtor obtained
continuances in bad faith, in the mean time disposing of property and
consenting to bankruptcy adjudication, held guilty of contempt); Credit
Assets Corp. v. Rockmore, (1929) 135 Misc. Rep. 230, 237 N. Y. S.503.
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It is of great practical importance to determine whether a
proceeding to adjudge a person in contempt in order that he may
be fined for the benefit of a party to the action is a civil or a
criminal proceeding. In most jurisdictions the defendant in a
criminal contempt proceeding is given the same rights as a defendant in an ordinary criminal case. Provisions are made for
jury trial by statute,41 and the accused cannot be compelled to
testify against himself.4 2 If these statutes and rules, applicable to
criminal contempts, govern a proceeding of this kind, in any particular case, it is obvious that the complaining party will be
faced with greater difficulties in the manner and degree of proof.
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has not
always been so carefully defined by writers and judges as it
might have been. Criminal contempt is usually defined as an act
which is directed against the dignity and authority of the court,
while civil contempt is said to be a failure or refusal to do something ordered by the court to be done for the benefit of a party
to an action. 3 It would follow from these definitions that a proceeding to procure indemnity because of a contempt where the
party attached had violated an injunction, order in supplementary
proceedings, or other writ or decree, for the benefit of a party, is
a civil proceeding, but it might seem that where the contempt
consisted in perjury or the bringing of a fraudulent action
the proceeding was for criminal contempt and to be governed by
the rules applicable to criminal contempts. It is submitted, however, that the customary definitions distinguishing the two types
of contempt are not sufficiently inclusive; they may have been
lifted from cases where they had had a limited meaning and long
held up as general rules with insufficient discrimination and analysis of the principles involved.
It is common knowledge that the same act may have both
civil and criminal consequences, as where an assault is committed. In such a case the act might be called both tortious and
criminal, or perhaps speaking in pure technical language the act
itself should not be referred to as either civil or criminal, for it is
4128
U. S. C. A., sec. 387, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 387.
42
A contempt proceeding, however is never a criminal prosecution.
A person attached for contempt may thereafter be indicted and punished
for the crime he has committed. Beale, Contempt of Court, (1908) 21
Harv. L. Rev. 161, 173.
432 Words & Phrases 1194. Rapalje, Contempt, sec. 15. Fox, The
Practice in Contempt Cases, (1922) 38 L. Q. Rev. 185; (1921) 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 459.
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the judicial proceedings which arise as a consequence of the act
which are either criminal or civil. These proceedings are characterized as such, not by the nature of the act itself, for the act
itself gives rise to both types of proceedings, but by the character
of the parties and proceeding before the court and the remedy
sought.
There are a few well reasoned decisions where this line of
thought is recognized as the true basis of the distinction between
civil and criminal contempts. The conclusion of these decisions
is that the distinction between civil and criminal contempt lies,
not in the character of the act of contempt, but in the character
of the proceeding for contempt and the nature of the remedy
sought.
The Supreme Court of The United States in Gompers v. Buck
Stove & Range Co.4 drew the distinction as follows:
"Proceedings for civil contempt are between the original parties and instituted and tried as a part of the main cause. But on
the other hand, proceedings at law for contempt are between the
public and the defendant and are not a part of the original cause."
Two tests were set up by the court. First is the purpose of
the punishment. Where a sentence is wholly punitive, the proceedings are criminal, and the rules as to presumption of innocence apply. But where fine or imprisonment is imposed for the
purpose of coercing obedience to an order, the proceeding is not
thereby rendered criminal in its nature. And where the only
relief is remedial for the purpose of indemnifying a party, the
proceeding is civil. The second test is in the nature of the proceeding. The court remarked that a criminal contempt should
have been entitled "'United States v. Gompers et al" or "17 re
Gompers." The contempt proceeding in question being under the
original title to the action indicated it was a civil proceeding.
And the court further found that the prayer for relief, "that the
44(1910) 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 874.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Lamb v. Cramer, (1932)

52 Sup. Ct. 315, clearly indicated that its conclusions in the Gompers case
would be followed: "It is the purpose of the punishment, rather than the
character of the act punished, which determines whether the proceeding is
for civil or criminal contempt. Even though the particular acts of the
petitioner may take the characteristics of both a civil and a criminal contempt, and so may not be classified as exclusively one or the other, still,
under the allegations and prayer of the petition, it would have been competent for the District Court to have punished the contempt by its coercive
order until Lamb made restitution of the property or to have imposed a
fine, payable to the receiver, compensating for its taking.

to secure such relief is civil in its nature."

A proceeding
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petitioner may have such other and further relief as the case may
require," showed that the proceeding was not for the government
to vindicate the authority of the court, but for the relief of the
complainant.
The New York court of appeals has declared the established
nomenclature faulty on analysis and has suggested that the distinction should be termed "private" and "public" contempts to
indicate that the nature of the proceeding, rather than the act, is
determinative. 4" The supreme court of Minnesota has also ob45"The occasion and result of proceedings for contempt furnish a
clear and well defined line of division separating them into two classes
which have become somewhat mingled and confused by the use of a fixed
but ambiguous nomenclature. (In re Watson, (1870) 3 Lans. (N.Y.)
408, affirmed (1872) 5 Lans. (N.Y.) 466.) There may prove to be rare
and exceptional cases which do not easily fall within either class, or
some which so commingle the characteristics of both as to make their
location doubtful and difficult; but in the main the division is exhaustive and
clear. In one class are grouped cases whose occasion is an injury or
wrong done to a party who is a suitor before the court, and has established a claim upon its protection; and which result in a money indemnity
to the litigant, or a compulsory act or omission enforced for his benefit.
In these cases the authority of the court is indeed vindicated, but it is,
after a manner, lent to the suitor for his safety, and vindicated for his
sole benefit. The authority is exerted on his behalf as a private individual,
and the fine imposed is measured by his loss and goes to him as indemnity;
and imprisonment, if ordered, is awarded, not as a punishment, but as a
means to an end, and that end the benefit of the suitor in some act or
omission compelled which are essential to his particular rights of person
or of property .... The second class of contempts consists of those whose
cause and result are a violation of the rights of the public as represented
by their constituted legal tribunals, and a punishment for the wrong in
the interest of public justice, and not in the interest of an individual
litigant. In these cases if a fine is imposed its maximum is limited by a
fixed general law, and not at all by the needs of individuals; and its
proceeds when collected go into the public treasury and not into the purse
of an individual suitor. The fine is punishment rather than indemnity, and
if imprisonment is added, it is in the interest of public justice and
purely as a penalty, and not at all as a means of securing indemnity to
an individual. Necessarily these contempts in their origin and punishment
partake of the nature of crimes, which are violations of the public law,
and end in the vindication of public justice; and hence are named
criminal contempts. As described in the statute, an element of willfulness,
or of evil intention enters into and characterizes them. They are a disturbance of the court which interferes with its performance of duty as a judicial
tribunal; willful disobedience to its lawful mandate; resistance to such
mandate willfully offered; contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn
as a witness, or to answer a proper question; and publication of a false
abd grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings. These cases and their
punishment are placed under the head of 'general powers of the courts and
their attributes;' and they very evidently relate to public offenses tending
to cast discredit upon the administration of public justice, and having no
reference to the particular rights of suitors. But here again we find that
they occur as well in civil as in criminal actions, and so, for convenience,
we may speak of them in view of the present classification, as public contempts, although the established legal nomenclature must remain unchanged."
People v. Oyer, etc., Court, (1886) 101 N. Y. 245, 4 N. E. 259, 54 Am.
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served this distinction, 48 and has pointed out that the same proceeding may partake of both civil and criminal characteristics
where the remedy sought is dual, for the private benefit of a party
and for punishment to vindicate the authority of the court.'7

Un-

fortunately, however, in these jurisdictions there are also decisions which, failing to recognize these principles, quote the old
formulas without discrimination, with the result that there is in
the law a confusion which is misleading to the bar and the trial
courts. 4
The statutory definitions of civil and criminal contempts also
furnish some clues. In defining criminal contempts there is usuRep. 691. See also Eastern C. S. Co. v. B. & M., etc., Local No. 45,
(1922)6 200 App. Div. 714, 193 N. Y. S. 368.
4 In State v. Leftwich, (1889) 41 Minn. 42, a contempt proceeding
was brought before the supreme court on certiorari. The court in determining whether review should be by appeal or certiorari had to determine
whether the proceeding was civil or criminal. The test was made as
follows: "But objection was made that appeal, and not certiorari, is the
proper mode of bringing such a matter here for review. This, we think,
depends on the nature and purpose of the adjudication for contempt. In
Re Fanning, (1889) 40 Minn. 4, 41 N. W. 1076, we held that an order
committing for contempt may have a double aspect-First, in the nature
of a remedy to a party to enforce his rights; Second, punitive merely, in
punishment of the offence of contempt... When of the former character
it is a proceeding in the action between the parties; when of the latter, it
is collateral to it, and the parties, as such, have no interest in it."
In State v. Willis, (1895) 61 Minn. 20, 63 N. W. 169, where the
defendant had been punished for contempt in failing to pay alimony, the
court held' that the proceeding could not be reviewed by certiorari as it was
not criminal.
In Red River Potato Growers' Association v. Bernardy, (1915) 128
Minn. 153, 150 N. W. 383, the court defined civil and criminal contempt
as follows: "A proceeding in civil contempt is one instituted in a civil
action for the private benefit of a party to the action, and where punishment is imposed it is remedial and is imposed for the benefit of the party
and to aid in the enforcement of his alleged rights. A proceeding in
criminal contempt is one instituted for the sole purpose of penalizing the
defendant. Its purpose is public and it is resorted to to maintain and
vindicate the authority of the court and to secure the orderly conduct of
Court procedure. . . . The same act of disobedience may have a double

aspect.7 It may warrant punishment for both civil and criminal contempt."
4 Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Op., (1922) 151 Minn. 238, 186
N. W.
787.
48 State ex rel. Sandquist v. District Court, (1919) 144 Minn. 326,
175 N. W. 908, while the opinion indicates that the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt is to be determined by the nature of the
act, the record in this case shows that the defendant was given a definite
prison sentence for tampering with a juror, the proceedings having been
brought by the State, and clearly a criminal contempt proceeding. See also
Franzone v. Tumminelli, (1910) 67 Misc. Rep. 549, 123 N. Y. S. 455.
But cf. Blanchard v. Bryant, (1921) 83 Okla. 33, 200 Pac. 444, where
after stating the customary definitions of civil and criminal contempt
the court said, "The term 'civil' is used to denote the purpose sought to
be accomplished. If the purpose sought is remedial and for the benefit
of a party to the litigation, then it is civil."

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

ally a provision that they shall be misdemeanors, or authorizing
certain punishments. 49 These statutes also frequently define disobedience of a court order as a criminal contempt, although the
decisions would indicate that at common law such a contempt is
civil."' Likewise, statutes define as contempts punishable civilly
matters which are in clear disregard of the authority of the court. 1
Since a proceeding to obtain indemnity from a party guilty
of contempt is a proceeding between the parties to the action to
enforce a private remedy, it would seem that the proceeding
should be deemed a civil contempt proceeding regardless of the
5 2
character of the act constituting the contempt.
The amount of indemnity which may be awarded in a proceeding of the kind here discussed is of interest to complete the
paper, but does not warrant extended discussion. In most cases
it is held that the fine must be based on proof of damage actually
sustained as a proximate result of the contempt.5 3 Included in
the award may be fair and reasonable compensation to the complaining party for fees paid his attorney for his services in the
proceedings, and the fine should be sufficient to cover costs and
expenses to which he has been put by reason of the misconduct.9
49

Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, sec. 9803. McKinney's Consol. Laws oi
N. Y., Bk. 29, sec. 750.
50
Mason's Minn Stat., 1927, sec. 10042, "Criminal Contempts.-Every
person who shall commit a contempt of court, of one of the following
kinds shall be guilty of a misdemeanor: . . . 4. Wilful disobedience to the
lawful process or other mandate of a court. 5. Resistance wilfully offered
to its lawful process or other mandate."
McKinney's Consol. Laws of N. Y., Bk. 29, sec. 750, "A court of
record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a person guilty of
either of the following acts, and no others: . . . 3. Wilful disobedience to
its lawful mandate. 4. Resistance wilfully offered to its lawful mandate.
51
McKinney's Consol. Laws of N. Y., Bk. 29, sec. 753. "A court of
record has power to punish, by fine and imprisonment, or either, a neglect
or violation of duty, or other misconduct, by which a right or remedy of
a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the court may
be defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced, in either of the following
cases5 2: . . .
Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, (1922) 151 Minn.
238, 186 N. W. 787, "The fine was imposed 'for the benefit of plaintiff
herein,' and therefore cannot be held to be a penalty imposed under section
8363 for the criminal contempt. Consequently it rests upon the provision
of Section 8364 authorizing the Court to award indemnity to plaintiff
'for actual loss or injury.' . . . That the award may be designated as a
fine does not change its character. It is imposed for the purpose of
compelling defendants to mbke compensation for the loss or injury caused
to plaintiff
by their violation of the order and judgment of the court."
53
Socialistic Co-op. Pub. Assn. v. Kuhn, (1900)
164 N. Y. 473,
58 N.54 E. 649.
Fine v. Clinton Realty Co., (1918) 105 Misc. Rep. 318, 173 N. Y. S.
137; People v. Rochester, etc., R., (1897) 76 N. Y. 294; Campbell v.
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The New York Statute provides for a payment of $250.00 in addition to actual damages.55 A fine for that amount may be imposed even in absence of proof of damages and paid to the complaining party.16 Payment of the fine may be coerced by imprisonment, and it is proper to issue an execution or mandate against
the person, rather than against his property. 7 It has been held
that a fine for contempt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy"' and
that there can be no pardon for civil contempt. 9
Motion
55 Picture Mach. Op., (1922) 151 Minn. 238, 186 N. W. 787.
McKinney's Consol. Laws of N. Y., Bk. 29, sec. 773.
56Root v. Rich, (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1918) 170 N. Y. S. 871 (failure
to appear at supplementary proceedings); Matter of Starr v. Morange,

(1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 376, 196 N. Y. S. 376; Kennedy v. Swan, (1930)
136 Misc. Rep. 367, 240 N. Y. S. 81 (disobedience of order forbidding trans-

fer of
57 property).
Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, (1922) 151 Minn.
238, 186 N. W. 787.
"It is urged that payment of the money judgment entered by the
court cannot be enforced by imprisonment without violating the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. That a person convicted of contempt, who fails to comply with the judgment imposed
therefore, may be coerced to do so by imprisonment without infringing
this constitutional provision, whether the judgment directs the payment of
money or the doing of some other act, has been settled too long and
too firmly to require further discussion or the citation of authorities."
Stewart v. Smith, (1919) 186 App. Div. 755, 176 N. Y. S. 468;
McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y. Bk. 29, sec. 774, as amended L 1919,
cl. 184 (providing for imprisonment for a term up to six months for failure
to pay8 fine.)
In re Koronsky, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1900) 170 Fed. 719, 96 C. C. A.

39; Spalding v. New York, (1846) 4 How. (U.S.) 21, 11 L Ed. 858;
People
v. King County, (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 206 Fed. 566.
59
State v. Verage, (1922) 177 Wis. 295, 187 N. W. 830.

